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Is Iran an Offensives Realist or a Defensive Realist? A
Theoretical Reflection on Iranian Motives for Creating
Instability
Rusty Treviño
After examining Iran's actions and capabilities, the findings clearly indicate that Iran is acting in
a defensive manner to protect against conventional invasion. While Iran has supported exporting
Islamic Revolution, Shiite takeover of States, and State interference through militias and terrorist
groups; all these actions do not create a network of offensive capabilities to become a hegemony
they merely allow Iran to create crippling instability in the case of war or invasion. Iran's nuclear
program is geared towards having a nuclear capability, not a nuclear weapon. This shows a
fixation on deterrence of traditional State invasion. Much of Iran's military capabilities could be
considered irregular and is geared to resistance, not invasion.
Another finding is increased repression of traditional regime stake-holders, most notably
reformers, elected officials, and leftist clerics; it appears that a new regime of an altered State
power structure has replaced the above actors with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) and its affiliates. The term regime no longer refers to clerical bodies and elected
officials, but to the IRGC with support from the Ayatollah. In this deal, the Ayatollah is given
protection from competing State entities and the ability to continue administering the country as
he sees fit, in exchange the IRGC continues to receive huge chunks of the Iranian economy that
they use to enrich themselves. Meaning, the focus of the new regime is defense and survival in
order to continue their goals, not expansion. Continuing containment and disruption is
recommended and military action is discouraged.

Iran in International Theory
The west has often looked on Iran as a threat and a genuine problem for regional stability in the
Middle East. International relations theory has two distinct theories about its aggressive
behavior; the first idea is that Iran sees a chance to become a regional hegemony, meaning it
intends to take all opportunities and push itself into the dominant possibly even imperial position
in the Middle East: economically, culturally and politically. The other main vein of thought
revolves around the idea of defensive realism, this theory proclaims that States engage in
aggressive behavior designed to protect them in the chaotic and unpredictable world of
international politics. In examining both theories and Iranian history, a clearer picture will
emerge showing Iranian interests, motivations, and endgame. The results conclude a mismatch of
perception, Iran's neighbors and would be competitors see it as a potential hegemony looking to
control and exploit them, while Iran sees itself as survivor in a world full of enemies, clinging to
its familiar tactics of extra-legal violence and terrorism for lack of a better option.1

1
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A Brief on Contemporary Iranian History
The current Iranian State was born in 1979, the product of a societal revolution against a western
ally many in Iran considered a puppet. The revolution was the product of many different groups;
students, communists, liberals, and Islamists among many others.2 The Islamists eventually took
over the revolution and the country, and then installed a theocracy with an exterior layer of
electoralism. This theocracy was formed under a branch of Islam that was contrary to most of
their Sunni Arab neighbors and rulers, this Iranian branch was Shi’a Islam. Unfortunately the
Shi'a were and still are a majority in neighboring Iraq, the problem for Iran was that Iraq was
brutally ruled by minority Sunnis and the infamous Saddam Hussein. Many in Iraq saw the new
Shi'a theocracy as a grave threat to their Sunni supremacy, they viewed the only way to contain
the new Shi'a threat was to destroy the theocracy and absorb the country while the regime was
still weak and in its infancy.3 This is not to say that Iraq was completely defensively minded,
they themselves were the striving hegemony and consuming neighboring Iran (and its natural
resources) would have made them the undisputed regional great power.4 The argument about
which motivation drove the invasion of Iran can be argued, but both of those ideas of thought
were present. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran with the tacit approval of the U.S., who was still angry
about the dethroning of their ally the Shah and the hostage crisis.5 The U.S. would even fight on
Iraq's side in an undeclared naval war, sinking Iranian ships in the middle of the Iraq-Iran
conflict which also featured chemical weapons use by Iraq.6 This would reinforce the distrust set
in motion by the western aided 1953 coup against the democratically elected Iranian Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadeq.7 These events set the tone for the U.S.-Iranian relationship that
would continue until this day. It is this tension that continues to confuse the question of whether
Iran wants to be the hegemony of the Middle East or if they're just defensively engaged in
whatever behavior they feel will protect their regime.

Shi’ite Revolution
The Shi'ite have at many times and places in history been an oppressed people, since the days of
its founding. It is a messianic sect that believes in the eventual rising of the hidden 12th Imam
who would right all the wrongs and smite the wicked. An oppressed group in many countries
(even in some where they are the majority) the Shiite has seen themselves as a people destined to
suffer.8 This changed after the Iranian Revolution which showed that the Hidden Imam was not
needed to make their world better, they could take freedom from the Sunnis and now they had a
supporter in the struggle, the Iranian Shiite theocratic State.9 The Iranian revolution sent shockwaves of fear through the Arab-Sunni community that many felt threatened by a possible Iranian
2

Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran's Crumbling Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 82:1 (Jan. - Feb. 2003): 44-57.
Iran Chamber Society, “The History of Iran: The Iran-Iraq War,” Non-Profit Cultural Organization, 2012,
available at: http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war3.php.
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5
Ian Lustick, “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical Perspective,”
International Organization 51: 4 (Autumn 1997): 653–83.
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backed Shiite rebellion. Decades later the Sunni-Shiite divide continues to fuel intrigue and
suspicion whenever a State in the Middle East finds itself with the possibility of an uncertain
future.10

The Many Cold Wars of Iran
Theocratic Iran has been involved in a cold war of subterfuge, assassination, terrorism, and
intimidation since its birth. The struggle for its birth, the eight year war for its existence, and the
continual threat of instability from many neighbors and great powers has made the life of the
regime increasingly erratic and dangerous. This has lead Iran into a sense of urgency and the
need to create alliances with those that can help them survive and strike back against geopolitical
meddling; meaning terrorist groups, including both Hezbollah and Hamas, but also with the
Assad family who rule Syria. Some of these problems are due to Iran's ingratiation into the Arab
world's problem of Israel and Palestine, and its fiery rhetoric about “wiping Israel off the map.”
They have done this while seeking nuclear technology and it has not helped their cause of
security, and in fact has earned them Israel as a belligerent unlike any in the region. In the media
there are many separate reports of Iran engaging in cold war type activities with Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the U.S. Iran may proclaim its ambitions loudly, its neighbors believe
it, and some scholars may say so, but examining the possibilities seems to refute this idea.11

Iran as an Offensive Realist
In Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, if Iran was the one and only great power of the
region they would attempt to reach hegemony in their region, through conquest.12 In this context
a great power is country capable of credibly threatening the survival of neighboring countries
and exerting a global influence that benefits their country. This would be called the offensive
realist theory, in which Iran would use its power and influence to become an imperialistic
hegemony in de facto control the Middle East through intimidation, enriching itself on the oil
wealth of its exploited neighbors. This is probably the narrative that the Arab Gulf States, Israel,
and Turkey believe; the idea that Iran flexes its muscles and its connection to oppressed Shiites
to create a strength that would allow it to force others to obey its will. When examining Iran's
rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia, they are probably not great powers because of lack of population
to threaten the survival of Iran as a State that would have to be occupied. They are however
middle economic powers which allow them many resources with which to slow what they
believe is Iran's attempts to remake the Middle East. Turkey might fit the great power description
better, but its institutional focus on government reform and economic growth has distracted it
from attempts to gain geopolitical expansion of influence and it is not strong enough (militarily,
politically, economically) to definitively exert influence on unwilling neighbors. Turkey's
priorities have changed after the Arab Spring, it seems to be moving into the belief that Iran has
overreached, especially in its actions with Syria and the Turks perception of Iran's improving
relations with Kurdish terrorist and rebel groups.13
10

John R. Bradley, “Saudi Arabia's invisible hand in the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs October 13, 2011.
Trita Parsi, “Israel and the Origins of Iran's Arab Option: Dissection of a Strategy Misunderstood.” Middle East
Journal 60:3 (Summer, 2006): 493-512.
12
Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
13
Staff Article, “Turkey, Iran Friction Deepening on Syria,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly (August 9); Damien
McElroy, “Syria and Iran 'backing Kurdish terrorist group', says Turkey,” The Telegraph, September 2012.
11
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However one categorizes Iran, they are expanding their regional influence, this means that the
United States as the only superpower, has a distinct interest in keeping them from establishing
their own regional dominance which would upset American power and interests in the region. In
offensive realism theory, this also brings the United States into the act of balancing the Iranian
menace mostly with economic sanctions aimed at crippling the Iranian economy and its ability to
continue its nuclear program and perceived Hegemonic expansion. In this balancing Israel
(Netanyahu) continues to try and push the U.S. into a conflict to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities by
continually asking and pressuring the United States to draw a “red line” which when crossed by
Iran will be the agreed point at which a bombing will commence.14 The United States has
continually denied drawing a red line, despite repeated pressure from Israel.15 The scenario Israel
envisions is that an Iran with nuclear bomb technology and ties to terrorism could act as the
mastermind in a nuclear extortion plot. This is one of two scenarios Israel views while the other
has Iran giving out nukes to terrorists to destroy Israel. Saudi Arabia also fears the possibility of
nuclear extortion by Iran while many fear that Iran getting nuclear technology would set off an
arms race with Saudi Arabia, which over many years would divert government funds that could
have gone to improving living standards. This could further destabilize the region by increasing
popular economic and social grievances.16
All of that information aside, when compared to past attempted hegemonies, Iran doesn't fit the
model because it requires conquest. All hegemonies and contending hegemonies have used
conquest because that is the only avenue of the kind of State expansion of population, natural
resources, fertile land, and geographical positioning that would allow the necessary State
extraction of resources to continue a program of national expansion. Historical examples include:
the U.S. constantly expanding west, and then into the pacific and the Caribbean, imperial Japan
was constantly conquering pieces of Asia from 1895 onwards, Nazi Germany forced annexation
of the Czechs and Austria before conquering most of Europe, and Saddam's Iraq tried and failed
to conquer Iran then succeeded with Kuwait and then threatened conquest of Saudi Arabia.
Having influence like Iran has, is not the same as having exploitable land, resources, and people
gained through conquest. If Iran is planning a hegemonic adventure, they would need more
human, economic, and societal resources than what they have; influencing Iraq, Syria, Lebanon
and other Arab Shiite filled countries is far different from conquering or exploiting them in the
name of Persian imperialism. Even their military is far different from the industrial war machines
associated with imperialism it has more irregular strategies designed for resistance and
asymmetric warfare more than for traditional State-to-State warfare.17

Iran as the Defensive Realist
14

Fareed Zakaria, Fareed, “Netanyahu pushes for a war the US doesn't want,” The Daily Star, September 15, 2012;
Graham Allison, “Red Lines in the Sand,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 12, 2012.
15
Allison, “Red Lines in Sand.”
16
The Associated Press, “Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race,” New York Times, December
2011; Jeffrey Goldberg, Jeffrey, “Saudi Arabia Promises to go Nuclear f Iran does.” The Atlantic, February 7, 2012.
17
Ahmad Reza Babaei, Ahmad Reza, “Israel's concerns and Iran's nuclear program,” Economic and Political
Weekly 43:6 (Feb. 9 - 15 2008): 21-25; Michael Connell, “Iran's Military Doctrine,” In The Iran Primer, ed. Robin
Wright, 2010; Michaal V. Rienzi, “Iran's Response to a US attack,” Small Wars Journal, February 20, 2012.
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In the schema of defensive realism, Iran is expanding its influence and ties to non-state groups in
order to safeguard itself. Through its non-state actor allies and its important position on the oil
shipping Straits of Hormuz (which they have threatened to close), Iran has created for itself a
defensive position that would be hard to eject without causing serious upheaval to the region.
Not only does Iran have ties to Hezbollah and Hamas, but they also have strong ties into Iraq and
no one actually knows how deeply or what their Iraqi connections are capable of.18 The potential
collapse of the Assad regime offers even more opportunity for Iran to support non-state actors, or
Alawite (Alawites are another traditionally oppressed Muslim sect) militias that will continue to
fight long after the Assad regime has collapsed. It is also suspected the Iran has connections to
Shiite groups in Yemen, but no one really knows how deep Iran's connections are throughout the
Middle East.19 This means that Iran's defensive position has been created in a way that an
aggressive threat against Iran could set off a regional blaze of conflict with terrorists groups and
militias who presumable have access to Iranian armaments as has allegedly happened in Yemen,
Syria, Iraq.20
This idea of defensive realism puts of Iran's transgressions in the form of defensive posturing.
This makes some sense from an Iranian perspective since their view of western influence is
particularly negative and rooted with its own experience of imperialism, foreign spheres of
influence, and economic interference; whereas the west sees Iran's intransigence as evidence of
an aggressive extra-legal belligerent. To Iran, these continual transgressions are a continuation of
the battle for freedom from western imperialism. This sense was probably reinforced when the
U.S. orchestrated collapses of neighboring regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq following the 9/11
terrorist attacks. This as well as when George W. Bush labeled Iran in the Axis of Evil, an even
further indication that many in the U.S. are still seeking regime change. With these kinds of
bellicose threats coming from the U.S., it is only natural that a country would posture even
further into its defensive position and do everything possible to showcase its ability to destabilize
and wreak havoc if their existence is threatened, which it constantly is.

The Mismatch of Iran as Possible Hegemony
When examining the possibility of Iran as possible hegemony we must first consider whether
they are in a fact a great power in the region and then we must figure whether they are in fact the
only great power or one of several in the region. Iran by most measures is not a great power,
certainly not economically, industrially, or technologically. It does have a rather large economy
usually ranking in the top twenty, but not big enough to dominate its neighbors and always
lagging behind Turkey.21 The country’s population is around 75 million, larger than much of the
Arab world, but still comparable to Turkey and much smaller than Egypt.22 Industrially and
18

Staff Article, “Iran renews Hormus closure threats,” Reuters News Agency, July 15, 2012; Greg Bruno, “State
Sponsors (Of Terror): Iran,” The Council on Foreign Relations Website, October 13, 2011; Baer, Robert, The Devil
We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Crown Publishing, 2008).
19
Staff Article, “Yemen Seizes Iranian Arms,” UPI News Agency, October 11, 2012; Staff Article, “Yemen arrests
prompt President's warning to Iran,” BBC News, July 18, 2012.
20
Matthew Weaver and Brian Whitaker, “Syria receiving Iranian arms 'almost daily' via Iraq,” The Guardian
September 20, 2012; Ed O'Keefe and Joby Warrick, “Weapons prove Iranian role in Iraq, U.S. Says,” Washington
Post, July 5, 2011.
21
Staff Work, CIA Files, CIA Fact Book- Iran and Turkey. Last Updated October 4, 2012
22
Staff Work, CIA Files, CIA Fact Book- Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. Last Updated October 4, 2012
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technologically Iran has been making great strides in expanding indigenous military technologies
and expanding domestic car production with its use of oil currency. According to the OICA or
the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Iran is among the top fifteen in
car manufacturing and has doubled its capacity in the last seven years.23 This government
directed centralized expansion of economic capacity has come at the price of market efficiency,
creating problems with a bloated governmental sector and terrible crony capitalism and
corruption that badly decrease its capacity and sustainability.24 Despite continually expanding
industrial capacity, the government's mismanagement of the economy and monetary policy along
with international sanctions has created a GDP that has remained stagnant and is unable to create
enough jobs to salve the dissatisfaction of the people stemming from shortages of goods,
overinflated money, and lack of scientific and economic opportunities.25
So despite a constantly improving industrial and technological capacity (which can also include a
continually improving nuclear program) Iran is still not in a position to dominate its neighbors
because the State is not efficient enough to convert its gains into a strong State capacity, because
much of the gains are lost to corruption and ineffective government. Additionally these gains are
paid for by oil revenue they are not self-reinforcing and subject to the fluctuations in the market.
Meaning that when oil prices drop so does the lifeblood of these industries, which is widely
attributed to Saudi Arabia's orchestrated 2011 energy output increase in order to shrink Iran's
energy revenues and further destabilize the regime still reeling from sanctions and protests.26 All
of these factors plus Iran's zealous spending on foreign adventures, energy subsidies combined
with western sanctions has created high inflation rate in the country, with some watchers calling
it hyperinflation.27 Despite the shaky status of the regime, Iran is not deterred; flat-lining
economic growth, a failed revolution, growing monetary inflation, and a squeeze being put on
them from a diverse group of Americans, Israelis, Turks, and Arabs has not stopped Iran from
pursuing their goals. All this information on regime survival may seem contradictory, but it
makes more sense when the conflict is examined as an anti-imperialist pillar of legitimacy in the
Iranian Islamic Republic.

Iran and the Bomb
Iran's nuclear program has quickly become a huge concern among its neighbors and is the
leading cause for many of the sanctions being put against them. Saudi Arabian officials have
made many statements that if Iran achieves a bomb, it probably will as well.28 This leads to a
terrifying problem of an arms race in the Middle East, a region rife with unstable states and
violent non-state actors. Israel has made its pronouncements well known, after Iranian officials
said Israel should be wiped off the map, stopping Iran's march towards nuclear weapons would
stop at no limits. To this end, Israel and particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the
23

CIA Fact Book- Iran; OICA Website. Staff Work, Production Statistics, available at:
http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/.
24
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25
Ibid.
26
Andrew Scott Cooper, “The Oil Wars,” The Daily Beast, October 13, 2011.
27
Joby Warrick, “Food Prices, inflation rises sharply in Iran,” Washington Post, October 5, 2012 ; Addison Wiggin,
“In Terms of Hyperinflation, Iran going way of Weimar,” Forbes Magazine, October 10, 2012.
28
The Associated Press, “Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race,” New York Times, December 6,
2011.
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defense minister Ehud Barak, have engaged in a campaign for U.S. support concerning a military
strike on Iran, citing the imminent danger they face from a country that has threatened to destroy
them.29
When Iran agrees to this narrative, they are showing support for the Palestinian cause, and to a
lesser extent to the Arab world that sees no movement towards a solution for Palestine. It is
bluster aimed at rallying support and building a base of support for Iranian influence in the Arab
world that has long seemingly given up on finding a solution to the Palestinian plight, but is it
not emblematic of Iranian intentions to use nuclear weapons to destroy Israel, especially since
Israel most likely possesses nuclear weapons. Though what many fear isn't the mutually assured
destruction of Iran and Israel, but rather the terrorist use of nuclear weapons provided by Iran to
destroy Israel. It wouldn't seem to be in Iran's rational interest to endanger their country with
such a reckless act. This is the idea that all States are rational actors and in the narrative of Iran
as nuclear arms dealer, it doesn't work because it is too irrational. Even in the highest echelons of
Israeli leadership, it is acknowledged that Iran is a rational actor.30 This is not to say that Israel
doesn't have genuine fears, but when they are rationally calculated, those fears don't add up to
the narrative being offered by Benjamin Netanyahu.
It is known that all States seek security and what is apparent is that Iran getting nuclear weapons
even nuclear technology, threatens Israel's security regardless of Iran's true intentions. It is
rational for Israel to do everything in its power to prevent this, even if it means embroiling the
U.S. in another war or military action, something Netanyahu has arguably been trying to do
since 1996.31 The reasoning behind this is that Israel does not have the capacity to wage a war
the size they need to in order to stop Iran's nuclear program, more on this briefly. This combined
with Iran's ties to both Hezbollah and Hamas could create an uncontrollable storm of violence
and chaos for Israel that would be untenable if they did not have U.S. support on several levels.
This is also not considering the economic upheaval promised by Iran in the disruption of energy
and oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz.32 All these elements will be considered in their
inter-connected context after the possibility of a successful strike is examined.
In the background of all these scenarios, is the question of whether an air-strike would even work
in stopping or delaying Iran's nuclear program. Robert Gates has stated that an air-strike would
not put a halt to the Iranian program and would also be a catastrophic error.33 Though in the 2012
Vice Presidential Debate Joe Biden expressed a belief that the U.S. had the capacity to stop
Iranian production with an airstrike saying, “We feel quite confident we could deal a serious
blow to the Iranians.”34 In Israel several former heads of intelligence have decried the idea of a
strike as gravely unnecessary and opening a Pandora’s Box of troubles.35 So while some in the
29

Aaron David Miller, “Netanyahu's red line isn't getting him anywhere,” CNN.com, September 28, 2012.
Reuters, “Israeli military chief: I doubt Iran's 'rational' leadership will make nuclear bomb,” NBC News.com, April
6, 2012.
31
Graham Allison, “Red Lines in the Sand,” Foreign Policy Magazine, 12 October 2012.
32
David Blair, “Iran Threatens to close Straits of Hormuz over EU sanctions,” The Telegraph, January 23, 2012.
33
Staff Article, “Gates Warns Against Attack on Iran,” United Press International, October 4, 2012.
34
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35
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U.S. think that the capacity to stop Iran with an air-strike exists, many in Israel seem to question
if it is possible for them to do it alone, as noted above the intelligence community feels that a
failed attack against Iran would only accelerate the Iranian race for nuclear technology as a
deterrence. U.S. military involvement seems to be the only credible road to potentially stopping
Iran, which creates a huge incentive for Israel to find any avenue to drag the U.S. into a conflict
in the Middle East, especially when there are so many unknowns as to what the outcome and
many possible consequences of an airstrike on Iranian nuclear sites would entail.

The Iranian Race Against Time
In the examination of whether Iran will get nuclear weapon technology it is important know their
current capacities and time-line. According to recent reports in October 2012, Iran is still at least
12-14 months away from having a nuclear weapon.36 The breakdown exists at 2-4 months to
amass enough highly enriched uranium, and then another 8-10 months to weaponize it.
According to IAEA If Iran started created diverting uranium to weaponization the world
community would find out and then have several months to stop that process.37 This time-line
has been pushed back some by Iran's transfer of some of its already enriched uranium to medical
treatment, which has stopped Israeli plans for a strike in the immediate future.38 This is great for
momentary consolation, but the truth is that the longer Iran continues their nuclear program, the
shorter their time-line will become to weaponize it later.
When all the pieces are put together the unrest in Iran caused by sanctions, Iran diverting its
nuclear supply and Israel delaying strike plans, it can be interpreted as a race to survival or
destruction for Iran. The west and Israel hope they can push Iranian weaponization back until the
regime cracks and breaks under sanctions and civilian revolution. Iran hopes their oppressive
apparatus holds out long enough to allow their nuclear efforts to deliver energy and tangible
benefits to the people while shortening their breakout time for nuclear weaponization.39 At this
point, the research and evidence seems to lead to the idea that Iran does not want a nuclear
weapon they want the capability to create a nuclear weapon in a very short time frame. Nuclear
weapons offer western justifications for war, but if Iran has the ability to create a nuclear weapon
quickly (within the time span of a western military mobilization for an invasion), it offers the
deterrence of nuclear weapons without the threat of actually having one—much like other
nations who have a nuclear capability, but do not have the weapons.40

Recent Struggles within the Iranian State Apparatus
In more recent years there has not just been an Iranian struggle with outside forces, but also
power struggles and push for change within the regime for reform.41 The 1990s brought would36
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October 9, 2012.
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be reformers to the forefront of elected office in Iran. There was a small wave of reforms in that
time, but it all ended when the reformer President Khatami had most of his reform candidates
banned from running for election in a constitutional process by Iran's Guardian Council.42 This
intrastate struggle ended peacefully with Khatami backing down and then a slow build up of the
power of the armed forces under the supervision of the Ayatollah, effectively neutralizing any
supposed electoral and constitutional restraints. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even remarked
that Iran was becoming a military dictatorship probably referring to the growing power of Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This became most apparent after the 2009 Iranian elections
in which the reformists candidate were declared losers with many suspicious electoral
anomalies.43 This led to the Green Movement, a failed protest movement & revolution against
the official results of the 2009 election. The reformers and leftist clerics would now be blocked
from running for office and their movement all but neutralized.44
Then in 2011 there was even more dramatic conflict from within the new regime. Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad the conservative president of Iran and the subject of the Green Movement protests
was put under pressure by the ruling clerics and parliament. From the small amount of
information available, it seems his populist persona was gaining power as he kept subsidies to
voters from being cut against the will of Parliament. Ahmadinejad was acting in a way consistent
with an elected official concerned with voters. He then started accumulating loyalists in
government and strengthening ties within the military.45 Ahmadinejad was seen as trying to gain
more power and build a political infrastructure for power and influence when he was term
limited out of the presidency.46 Many thought Ahmadinejad might have been preparing for a
coup or some kind of government takeover under the auspices of democratic populism.47 This
buildup ended with many of his supporters being arrested and his military support evaporating,
forcing him to back down or risk imprisonment or death.48 This should confirm that hardliners
and militarists are in firm control of Iran and that elected officials (conservative or reform) are in
danger if they proceed independently of the Ayatollah and the IRGC.

The Amplification of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was founded as a militia by Ayatollah
Khomeini after the 1979 Revolution in order to safeguard the new regime from outside threats,
but more as a branch to eliminate ideological opposition and to protect the regime from the
traditional Iranian military.49 They are also a huge economic piece of the Iranian economy. At
first they turned their military construction and engineering towards rebuilding Iran after the
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Iran-Iraq war.50 The entrance of the IRGC into the economy has since expanded to between $1216 billion a year in government contracts alone (this figure is from 2007), which is not counting
outside business, illegal activities, and actual net worth which is unknown.51 Their influence has
steadily grown over the years and has become a central component to the regime, especially
since 2003. This is a significant time because it marks the end of the reformist movement as a
viable electoral force as was admitted by former Iranian President Khatami in 2004.52
When cause and effect processes are examined, it appears the growing strength of the reformist
movement threatened the establishment of the conservative clerics and undermined the
extremely right-wing Ayatollah himself. It was at this point that the clerics started ruling
reformist candidates not eligible for election and the revolutionary guard was able to enter
politics and fill the gaps as conservative populists, one of their most popular politicians was a
former Basij (a paramilitary militia in the IRGC) member named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Once
in power they were able to grant themselves huge amounts of leverage and economic
advantages.53 This ties into the economic debilitating corruption mentioned earlier. Through the
use of natural resource money from the regime, the IRGC were able to build an economic empire
that according to the U.S. Government, controls parts or all of the National Iranian Oil
Company.54 This seems to have been in conjunction with the Ayatollah, in a dual understanding
that the IRGC protects the Ayatollah and his power in exchange for being able to plunder Iran's
wealth with impunity from the dispatched reformist contingent or any would be conservative
populist champions.

Understanding all the Narratives Simultaneously
To its neighbors and competitors for influence in the Middle East Iran is a Machiavellian State
that ruthlessly schemes to overthrow Sunni regimes and replace them with Shiite puppet regimes.
When objectively examined, Iran does not have any of the necessary capacity to become a
traditional regional hegemony, and scholars in the literature refuse to even call it (or any Middle
Eastern country) a great power.55 With the Arab Gulf States and their oil built military machines,
united in their distrust of Iran, it is unlikely that Iran could effectively control them.56 When
combined with Israel and U.S. interests in limiting Iran's influence, Iran does not have any
chance to become a legitimate hegemony although the fact that all these players have banded
together shows Iran as a potential great power.
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Treviño: Is Iran an Offensives Realist or a Defensive Realist?

If Iran is not the hegemony, then it is the survivor who has persevered through wars, invasions,
collapsing neighbors, economic warfare, and an attempted revolution. The problem then is the
disconnect; everyone else sees Iran as the threat to regional stability because of its constant
accumulation of ill-reputed power through illegitimate tactics, Iran just sees itself as a defensive
realist fortifying itself while enemies assault it from all sides. Perceptions are creating reality and
narratives are continually self-reinforcing. Both sides are trapped in this created narrative of
struggle and neither side can give it up without losing confidence from either the public, the
elites in power, or in Iran's case losing a unifying theme that justifies the regime's existence. The
next point is that the U.S. and Israel can stall but cannot stop Iran from gaining a nuclear
capacity without complete war and economic upheaval, unless the regime is overthrown
internally by revolution. Unfortunately this creates an interest from both sides to continue the
status-quo; the U.S. refraining from military action as long as Iran refrains from weaponizing
their technology. A favorable course for the Unites States would be to quiet the more belligerent
rhetoric and engage Iran while continuing sanctions. This will create a lower level of animosity
so that constant threats and recriminations don't lead an unnecessary war and unnecessary
economic shocks.
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